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COMMENT ON VICTOR'S JUSTICE & THE
VIABILITY OF EXANTE STANDARDS
ROD RASTAN*
This Article offers some observations on the papers presented
by the panelists on the topic of situation and case selection before
the International Criminal Court (ICC). Professor William
Schabas offers a thought provoking piece seeking to stimulate
debate on the manner in which situations are identified for
investigation and cases selected for prosecution. He questions the
abiding disquiet reflected in the critique of victor's justice arising
from Nuremberg and Tokyo, since he considers contemporary
choices to investigate certain situations or indict particular
individuals derive similarly from political assessments adopted
under the guise of legal norms and prosecutorial discretion. He
suggests we should not be surprised by such an outcome, as it is,
in fact, inherent to the function of any prosecution service when it
has to decide among a pool of available prosecutorial targets. He
argues that political considerations appear to be particularly
prevalent at the ICC, where the Prosecutor gets to decide not just
who to prosecute (cases), but when and where to investigate
(situations). In the light of his critique that decision-making in
such matters is driven by political rather than legal calculus,
Schabas suggests that it would be best if they were, in fact, left in
the hands of political authorities, bearing in mind also that the
enforcement of justice anyway relies on political support. The
result of the overall analysis is to question the premise for an
independent Prosecutor acting proprio motu at the ICC and to
suggest, in its place, the need for prior political sanction and
guidance before proceeding with investigations and prosecutions.
The thesis put forward by Professor Schabas is intriguing,
coming as it does from a pioneer of the discipline rather than a
realpolitik sceptic. The allegations of political selectivity in
particular warrant careful consideration. The comment below
suggests that while provocative, Professor Schabas' thesis is
ultimately speculative based, in his own words, "upon intuition

* Ph.D. (LSE); LL.M. (Nottm); Legal Advisor, Office of the Prosecutor,
International Criminal Court. The views expressed herein are solely the
author's and do not necessarily reflect those of the Office of the Prosecutor or
the ICC. The author would like to thank Darryl Robinson for his helpful
comments on an earlier version of this paper.

569

570

The John Marshall Law Review

[43:569

rather than evidence."' The Article compares this wholesale
dismissal of the exercise (toward the identification of ex ante
standards for the initiation of investigations and prosecutions)
with an approach based on the exposition of legal and policy
standards, in the light of Professor Brian Lepard's article on the
role of fundamental ethical principles in the formulation of
prosecutorial guidelines. A final section examines the central
concern of both articles, on the extent to which politics infiltrates
the legal process.
I.

A CRITIQUE OF SELECTION
A.

Opening of Situations

The exercise of prosecutorial discretion in the selection of
individual cases for prosecution is not new. The reality of selection
is inherent in any accountability response to situations of mass
atrocity where there will typically be a large universe of crimes
committed by numerous perpetrators against countless victims.
What is unique before the ICC is the role of the Prosecutor in
identifying, in the first instance, the parameters of the Court's
jurisdiction, that is, the overall situation. This involves, subject to
judicial oversight, the establishment of the Court's material,
temporal, territorial, and/or personal jurisdiction. 2 The situation
frames in objective terms the theatre of investigations within
which the Prosecutor collects evidence in order to identify cases for
prosecution.
As Professor Schabas observes in his article, the ICC model
represents a departure from previous international courts and
tribunals where the formal decision to institute proceedings was
taken by states or a collection thereof (the Allied Powers or the
United Nations Security Council).3 These courts were by nature ad
hoc, designed to deal with pre-defined situations. By contrast, the
ICC is a permanent body that is empowered to act in relation to
future, as yet undetermined situations. Moreover, it can act
autonomously even where states did not request its intervention.
Specifically, Article 15 empowers the Prosecutor to open
investigations on his or her own initiative, subject to judicial
authorisation, where there is a reasonable basis to believe ICC
crimes have been committed in the territory or by the national of
1. William A. Schabas, Victor's Justice: Selecting "Situations" at the
InternationalCriminal Court, 43 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 535, 539 (2010).
2. Such judicial oversight occurs at the Article 15 stage where the
Prosecutor seeks to initiate an investigation proprio motu, as well as in the
context of proceedings under Article 17, 18, 53, 58, and 61. Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court arts. 15, 17, 18, 33, 58, 61, July 17, 1998,
2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
3. Schabas, supra note 1, at 539.
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any State Party. 4 Within the confines of the Court's treatyjurisdiction,5 thus, the Prosecutor can independently identify when
and where crimes warrant investigation without separate political
approval. At the same time, the scope for such proprio motu
authority cannot be held to constitute an infringement on state
sovereignty as it flows from a sovereign decision to accept the
Court's treaty jurisdiction and to be bound by its judicial
framework.6 The Rome Statute thereby invests the Prosecutor
with a mandate that is subject to clear legal parameters. The
Rome Statute also vests the ICC with independence of action
where a State Party or the Security Council refers a situation:
whereas situation-specific courts operated on the assumption that
investigations would proceed and cases would be brought forward
once they were established, the ICC can decline to act. In
particular, if the Prosecutor or the Court is not satisfied that the
statutory factors related to jurisdiction, admissibility, and the
interests of justice have been satisfied, an investigation or
7
prosecution can be rejected.
In his article, Professor Schabas questions whether the
political direction that tainted past incarnations of international
criminal jurisdiction with the adage of victor's justice has in fact
been remedied by the provision of proprio motu powers to the ICC

4. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 12(2). This may extend to any other
state that accepts the jurisdiction of the Court by a declaration lodged to that
effect; Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 12(3).
5. The term "treaty-jurisdiction" is used herein to refer to the competence
the Court enjoys by virtue of Article 12-as contrasted with jurisdiction
conferred by a Security Council referral pursuant to Article 13(b) of the Rome
Statute, which may extend to any Member State of the UN Charter. Id. arts.
12, 13(b).
6. It could be argued that the ICC does not have such consent where it
exercises jurisdiction over nationals of non-party states for ICC crimes
committed on the territory of States Parties. Id. art. 12(2)(a). However, the
exercise of domestic jurisdiction by a state over crimes committed by
foreigners on its territory is no novelty-it represents one of the most
traditional prerogatives of state sovereignty. The only exception that may
apply is where such a foreigner enjoys immunity from legal process in the
territorial state, for example, by way of diplomatic immunity or through a
Status of Forces Agreement. The ICC applies the same principles of
jurisdiction, which are delegated to it by States Parties. Id. arts. 12, 13(a), 14,
98.
7. Id. art. 53(1)(a)-(c); International Criminal Court, Rules of Procedure
and Evidence, Rule 48, ICC. Doc. ICC-ASP/1/3 (Part II-A) (Sept. 9, 2002)
[hereinafter ICC RPE]. Although the Pre-Trial Chamber (PTC) can request, at
the initiative of the referring body, a reconsideration of such a decision, the
Prosecutor cannot be forced to investigate or prosecute. The only exception is
where, despite meeting jurisdictional and admissibility requirements, the
Prosecutor decides not to proceed based solely of the interests of justice, in
which case the decision will only be effective if confirmed by the PTC. Rome
Statute, supra note 2, art. 53(3)(b).

The John Marshall Law Review

572

[43:569

Prosecutor.8 This is because Schabas believes the Prosecutor also
makes political decisions: "The discretion of the Prosecutor in
selecting situations under Article 15, and in agreeing to proceed
with selections that have already been referred by the Security
Council or by States Parties, pursuant to Articles 13(b) and 14
respectively, has an inherently political dimension . . . "9 and "[t]he
thesis in this Article is that the Prosecutor does, in fact, make
political choices."10 To support the thesis, Schabas traces examples
of where apparently political choices appear to have been made
under the guise of legal criteria."
The issues Schabas sets out in his article revisit well-trodden
debates between states during the negotiation of the Rome Statute
that ultimately settled on the decision to create an independent
prosecutorial authority.12 Of note, both proponents and opponents
of proprio motu powers referred to the risks of politicised
selectivity, as illustrated by the records of 1995 Ad Hoc Committee
and 1996 Preparatory Committee meetings:
Some delegations felt that the role of the prosecutor should be more
fully elaborated and expanded to include the initiation of
investigation or prosecution in the case of serious crimes under
general international law that were of concern to the international
community as a whole in the absence of a complaint. These
delegations were of the view that this expanded role would enhance
the independence and autonomy of the prosecutor, who would be in
a position to work on behalf of the international community rather
than a particular complainant State or the Security Council. In this
regard, attention was drawn to the limited role played by state
13
complaints in the context of certain human rights conventions.
Some delegations found the role of the Prosecutor, under article 25,
too restricted. In their view, States or the Security Council, for a
variety of political reasons, would be unlikely to lodge a complaint.
The Prosecutor should therefore be empowered to initiate
investigations ex officio or on the basis of information obtained from

8. Schabas, supra note 1, at 549.
9. Id.
10. Id.

11. See generally id.
12. Id.; Silvia Fernandez de Gurmendi, The Role of the International
Prosecutor, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, THE MAKING OF THE
ROME STATUTE: ISSUES, NEGOTIATIONS, RESULTS 177-78

(Roy S. Lee ed.,

1999); Philippe Kirsch & Darryl Robinson, Initiation of Proceedings by the
Prosecutor, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT:
A COMMENTARY 657-63 (Antonio Cassese et al. eds., 2002); Morten Bergsmo &
Jelena Pejic, Article 15, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 581-93 (Otto Triffterer ed., 2008).
13. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court, U.N. GAOR,
113, 50th Sess., Supp. No. 22,
U.N. Doc. A/50/22 (1995).
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any source.' 4
While conversely:
Some other delegations could not agree with the notion of an
independent power for the Prosecutor to institute a proceedings
before the Court. In their view, such an independent power would
lead to politicization of the Court and allegations that the
Prosecutor had acted for political motives. This would undermine
the credibility of the Court. This power could also lead to
overwhelming the limited resources of the Prosecutor with frivolous
complaints. A view was expressed that the complaint lodged by the
Prosecutor on his or her own initiative lacking the support of the
complainant State would be ineffective.' 5
Many of these themes are repeated by Schabas who argues in
different places throughout his article that the ICC Prosecutor is
either too independent or partisan; that he either takes political
decisions or conversely fails to listen sufficiently to political actors;
that he lacks political direction from states or takes too much of it
when deciding who to prosecute; that an impartial prosecutor need
not prosecute all sides, but failure to do so politicizes his office.' 6
The starting point for the article appears to be the concern
that "[t]he Rome Statute offers no real guidance on the criteria
that the Prosecutor is to apply in making determinations about
which situations to pursue and which ones to ignore." 7 For
Schabas, attempts to formulate ex ante standards toward a
prosecutorial policy that focuses on persons bearing the greatest
responsibility for the most serious crimes' 8 or for the
interpretation of the statutory notions of the interests of justice"
and gravity20 are described as "little more than obfuscation, a

14. Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an
InternationalCriminalCourt, $ 35, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 22, Vol.
I, U.N. Doc. A/51/22 (1996).
15. Id.
16. See generally Schabas, supra note 1.

17. Id. at 544. The factors set out in Article 53(1)(a)-(c) of the Rome Statute
require the establishment of a reasonable basis to believe a crime within the
jurisdiction of the Court has been or is being committed (material, temporal,
and either territorial or personal jurisdiction); the forming of a preliminary
determination on admissibility, involving an assessment of complementarity
and gravity; and consideration of whether the interests of justice militate
against the opening of investigations. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art.
53(1)(a)-(c). Rule 48 specifies that the same factors are to be considered at the
Article 15 stage. ICC RPE, supra note 7, Rule 48.
18. ICC-OTP, Paper on some policy issues before the Office of the Prosecutor,
6-7 (Sept. 2003); ICC-OTP, Report on Prosecutorial Strategy, 5 (Sept. 14,
2006); ICC-OTP, ProsecutorialStrategy, 5-6, 9-10, 14-15, 18 (Feb. 1, 2010).
19. See generally ICC-OTP, Policy Paper on the Interests of Justice (Sept.
2007).
20. See ICC, Regulations of the Office of the Prosecutor, Reg. 29(2), ICCBD/05-01-09 (Apr. 23, 2009) [hereinafter OTP Regulations] (stating "[iun order
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contrived attempt to make the determinations look objective and
judicial."21 The Prosecutor is described as disingenuous, taking
22
The
spurious political decisions in the name of the legal process.
opened
has
the
Office
of
where
examination
from
an
critique stems
situations and where it has not:
Does it really make sense that an objective application of the gravity
criteria proposed in materials from the Office of the Prosecutor leads
inexorably to five contiguous States in Central Africa? Can this be a
simple coincidence, the unintended conjuncture of the objective
application of selection criteria? Is there possibly some sort of policy
determination that is involved? Certainly, many states, especially
States Parties in the global north, and particularly the non-party
State that has become one of the keener supporters of the Court in
the last few years, the United States of America, seem very
comfortable with such a focus. There is much interest in the
to assess the gravity of the crimes allegedly committed in the situation the
Office shall consider various factors including their scale, nature, manner of
commission, and impact."). Schabas' discussion of gravity, in this regard, is
problematic for two reasons. The suggestion that gravity only became
significant for the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) in 2006 appears to overlook
the fact that some of the earliest OTP documents from 2003 already refer to
the centrality of considerations of gravity. See, e.g., ICC-OTP, Second
Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the InternationalCriminal
Court Report of the Prosecutor of the ICC, Mr Luis Moreno-Ocampo, (Sept. 8,
2003), (explaining the reason for focusing on the situation in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (DRC) by reference to reports indicating the particular
gravity of the crimes in terms of their scale and nature (an estimated 5,000
civilian deaths as a consequence of the violence since 2002); their manner of
commission (the use of summary executions, the burning of people alive,
physical mutilation, and the specific targeting of vulnerable groups, in
particular women and children); and their impact (noting the upsurge in
crimes has caused massive displacement, exacerbated poverty, famine, and
disease, and severely impacted on local economies and means of subsistence as
a result of the widespread looting and destruction of farms, mines and
commercial centres)). Moreover, Schabas places emphasis on an illustration
contained in the 2006 OTP response to communications received concerning
Iraq to discern a general policy position toward the use of a comparative
assessment of gravity across situations, but overlooks a more reasoned
explanation of the OTP's approach to gravity at the preliminary examination
stage as spelled out in its Article 15 application (and in the Pre-Trial
Chamber's decision) in the Situation in Kenya, which refers to the
admissibility assessment at the situation stage in terms of an examination of
the "potential cases" that would arise from an investigation of the situation,
based on the stated prosecutorial strategy of focusing on persons bearing the
greatest responsibility and the most serious criminal incidents. Schabas,
supra note 1, at 544; ICC, Situation in the Republic of Kenya: Request for
authorisationof an investigationpursuant to Article 15, TT 51, 107, ICC Doc.
ICC-01/09-3 (Nov. 26, 2009); ICC, Situation in the Republic of Kenya: Decision
Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an
50, 182, 188, ICC
Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya,
Doc. ICC-01/09-19-Corr (Mar. 31, 2010).
21. Schabas, supra note 1, at 549.
22. Id.
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warming of the United States to the Court, which many attribute to
the new administration. Actually, the process was underway well
before the 2008 election. It seems to be as much related to the fact
that the Court's priorities correspond to the strategic interests of the
United States, and most certainly do not threaten them, as it is to
the more progressive multilateralism of President Obama and
Secretary of State Clinton. 23
While the analysis is certainly provocative, it also appears
highly speculative. The suggestion is, variously, that the
Prosecutor has intentionally chosen five situations in Africa not
because they satisfy all of the legal criteria established by the ICC
Statute, but rather because of what it is not-an investigation into
other situations. The fact that the five states border each other
also appears relevant, suggesting something more than
coincidence. This leads to a critique of the global north versus the
global south and the supposed interest of the ICC to pander to the
new U.S. administration-an outcome that must have presumably
been foreseen with some insight in 2003 when the Office first
started its activities. Absent from the inquiry is an assessment of
why either the opening of investigations in those five situations is
irreconcilable with the statutory scheme or why the decision not to
investigate other situations is driven by political considerations. 24
The observation offered in support lacks elaboration: "there are
many serious situations on the territories of the 113 States Parties
to the Rome Statute, or elsewhere in the world but involving
nationals of States Parties." 25 The statement reflects one of the
weaknesses of Professor Schabas' critique. Irrespective of the
merits of his thesis, it is thin on the facts, drawing several strands
of thought to support an agenda of politicised selectivity (not a
light charge) based more often than not on what appears to be
observer bias rather than rigorous objective analysis. To borrow a
phrase coined by Schabas himself, "this is a speculative
hypothesis, based upon intuition rather than evidence." 26
23. Id.
24. See id. (stating that "[t]he Prosecutor regularly insists that his actions
and decisions are based on judicial and not political factors. But if this is really
the case, then we need a better explanation for the current choice of
situations. The 'gravity' language strikes the observer as little more than
obfuscation, a contrived attempt to make the determinations look objective
and judicial. The seriousness of the situations in Central Africa is
unquestioned. But there are many serious situations on the territories of the
113 States parties to the Rome Statute, or elsewhere in the world but
involving nationals of States parties.").
25. Id.
26. Id. Other examples of what appears to be a speculative approach
include Schabas' description of a division responsible, according to the OTP
Regulations, for the conduct of legal and factual analysis for preliminary
examinations in accordance with Article 53 and for processing request for
judicial assistance in accordance with Part 9 of the Statute as staffed with "a
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A central concern for Professor Schabas appears to be the
question why in practice to date, the Prosecutor's Office has
opened investigations in five situations within Africa, 27 dismissed
a large number of others, 28 and subjected a number of other
situations from Latin America to the Middle East, Caucasus,
Central Asia, and Africa to further preliminary examination
without yet initiating investigations. 29 Are these, in fact, outcomes
that can be justified by the impartial application of ex ante
standards, or rather, do they suggest politicized selectivity?
Because the ICC has potentially global reach, this often
translates into the rather unsophisticated demand that it have
cases from all parts of the world. However, unless one is asked to
apply the human resource assumptions of international
organisation, in terms of equitable geographic and gender balance
in staff recruitment, to the identification of situations for
investigation, it is not clear how one necessarily follows from the
other. One response to the Court's current presence in Africa is to
observe that all of the situations opened before the ICC represent
some of the most serious crimes committed anywhere in the world,
involving large-scale acts of wilful killing, sexual violence, and
forced displacement. As has often been recalled, the Court's
intervention in these situations is not against Africa, but rather
for the benefit of African victims: three of the five situations were

coterie of advisers . . . who assist with this political guidance." He also
speculates that "[p]ossibly external experts are also consulted from time to
time," while observing, "[o]ften, spokespersons for the office of the Prosecutor
acknowledge the role of political considerations in the selection of situations,"
but does not provide examples. Id. Other assertions appear unreasonable: for
example, when suggesting that (i) the Prosecutor is being deceptive in stating
that his decision are legal and not political, but (ii) his staff, who provide the
legal and factual underpinnings for such decisions, are either unaware of this
or are misguided: "Nor are these observations meant to attack the good faith of
those involved in these determinations, who have undoubtedly convinced
themselves that they have found a legalistic formula enabling them to do the
impossible, namely, to make what is inexorably a political decision but without
making it look political." Id.
27. That is, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Uganda, Central
African Republic (CAR), Darfur Sudan, and Kenya.
28. The Secretary-General, Annual Report of the International Criminal
Court to the United Nations, 1 44, U.N. Doc. A/64/356 (Sept. 17, 2009)
[hereinafter ICC Annual Report]:
As at 30 June 2009, the Office had received a total of 8,242
communications relating to article 15 of the Rome Statute, 4,870 of
which were received between 1 August 2008 and 30 June 2009. Of these
new communications, 3,823 related to the situation in South Ossetia,
Georgia. Of the remaining 1,047, 58 per cent (608) were considered as
not providing any basis for the Office of the Prosecutor to take further
action.
Id.
29. Situations currently under preliminary examination include Colombia,
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referred by African states themselves (Uganda, Democratic
Republic of the Congo (DRC), and Central African Republic
(CAR)), one by the Security Council determining the situation
constituted a threat to international peace and security (Darfur),
and one with the express co-operation and support of another
African state, with the backing of regional organisations and the
urging of the African Union Panel of Eminent African
Personalities (Kenya). The largest regional constituency among
ICC States Parties is Africa-comprising thirty-one African states,
while five judges of the eighteen-member bench are African, as is
the Deputy Prosecutor. Above all, the ICC serves as a court of
redress for African victims, who have called for more ICC
intervention, not less. Looking at the legal criteria established by
Article 53(1)(a)-(c) of the Rome Statute, the situations subjected to
investigation do, in fact, appear to relate to organised violence or
armed conflict constituting serious crimes within the jurisdiction
of the Court; there has been little or no domestic judicial response
to the crimes alleged in the resultant cases; and there have been
no apparent reasons not to proceed based on the interests of
justice.
Others have argued that while these situations may deserve
investigation, the Court should have also opened investigations
elsewhere: suggesting its limited regional presence undercuts its
aspiration to universality. 30 Implicit in the view is a demand that
the next situation must be outside of Africa. The implication,
however well intentioned, appears fraught with tension. It implies,
for example, that when the Prosecutor's Office determined that
there was a reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation into
the situation in Kenya, but not another situation, it should have
deferred or declined to act because there were already four
situations from Africa before the Court. Apart from the ethically
troubling nature of such a proposition, it would have sent a
particularly chilling message to Kenyan victims who may well
have questioned the relevance for them the fact that the ICC was
also investigating other crimes in other African countries. In an
era of fundamental human rights and equal dignity of each
individual, moreover, an institution restraining the application of
the law based on a regional quota system does not appear to be a
valid response to mass killings, rape, and forced displacement. 31
30. See, e.g., Schabas, supra note 1, at 549 (stating that "[t]he seriousness
of the situations in Central Africa is unquestioned. But there are many
serious situations on the territories of the 113 States parties to the Rome
Statute, or elsewhere in the world but involving nationals of States parties.").
31. It is also not evident that declining to investigate another situation in
Africa would serve the interests of justice pursuant Article 53(1)(c), which
forms the sole legal criteria for the Prosecutor not to proceed if the other
statutory criteria are met. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 53(1)(c).
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The focus of the debate should arguably re-orientate itself back
toward the crimes and whether potential cases warrant
investigation, not on geographic distribution and regional
balance. 32
It might also be contended that a pre-occupation with the
location of ICC investigation derives from a mindset constrained
by the prevalent political discourse, rather than the requirements
of justice. If the statutory criteria are met, a principled approach
would require the Court to proceed, irrespective of whether the
short-term outcome is another situation in Africa. By contrast,
succumbing to the political pressures to which the Court is
undoubtedly exposed would tend to undermine the application of
the fundamental rule of law principles that are its essential guide
and guarantor. To the extent that this might cause perception
problems for the ICC, arguably this is something that should elicit
more effective public information activities, not the adjustment
practice to suit perception. Thus, while allowing perception-based
considerations to steer core decision-making processes might
remedy concerns relating to universality, it creates acute
normative ambiguity by calling into doubt the objectivity of
prosecutorial conduct and the integrity of the judicial process. 33
The next question this raises is why other situations under
preliminary examination-some on other continents, some others
in Africa-have not yet yielded a determination to open
investigations. Is this guided by political considerations or legal
criteria? One difference that immediately emerges is that in all of
the investigations currently underway, issues of jurisdiction,
admissibility, and interests of justice appear to have been
relatively clear. In addition to satisfying jurisdiction and the
interests of justice, admissibility assessments rendered to date
indicate the competent authorities were either inactive or
otherwise unwilling or unable to constitute genuine domestic
32. Thus Schabas states in relation to the application to open investigations
in Kenya that "there is nothing in the application to indicate why the situation
in Kenya is more compelling than other situations elsewhere in the world that
may fall within the jurisdiction of the Court. Perhaps the Prosecutor did not
feel he needed to justify this aspect of his discretion in the application to the
Pre-Trial Chamber under Article 15," without explaining why this is either a
requirement of the Statute or relevant to an Article 15 application. Schabas,
supra note 1, at 544. Presumably such an explanation would not be necessary
if the Prosecutor had applied to open the situation in Colombia or
Afghanistan. While the need for communicating prosecutorial decisions to the
general public is valid, Professor Schabas appears to turn this into a legal test.
Id.
33. See infra Part II (outlining Professor Brian Lepard's discussion on
recourse to fundamental ethical principles to guide prosecutorial decisions);
see also infra note 70 (discussing the scope for tension between different
legitimacy claims, for example, between sociological legitimacy and normative
legitimacy).
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proceedings.34 The situations that remain under preliminary
examination appear to have presented more complex parameters:
either relating to the focus and/or genuineness of ongoing national
proceedings; the difficulty of obtaining clear and credible
information in the midst of ongoing armed conflict; the analysis of
large quantities of data submitted by rival national authorities on
the conduct of hostilities; or complex questions relating to
jurisdictional competence.35
34. Although admissibility has only been considered by the Court at the
situation stage in the Kenya situation in the context of an Article 15
application, admissibility assessments in the different proceedings before the
Court to date have either indicated the prima facie admissibility of cases or
rendered a final determination on the issue. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No.
ICC-01/04-01/06-8-Corr, Decision on the Prosecutor's Application for a
30-40 (Feb. 24, 2006); Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No.
Warrant of Arrest,
ICC-01/04-01/07-1497, Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Germain Katanga
against the Oral Decision of Trial Chamber II of 12 June 2009 on the
Admissibility of the Case, 1 78 (Sept. 25, 2009); Prosecutor v. Kony, Case No.
ICC-02/04-01/05-377, Decision on the admissibility of the case under article

19(1) of the Statute,

1 46

(Mar. 10, 2009); Prosecutor v. Harun, Case No. ICC-

02/05-01/07-1, Decision on the Prosecution Application under Art. 58(7) of the
Statute,
24 (May 1, 2007); Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/0501/09-3, Decision on the Prosecution's Application for a Warrant of Arrest
50 (Mar. 4, 2009); Prosecutor v.
against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir,

Garda, Case No. ICC-02/05-02/09-243-Red, Decision on the Confirmation of
Charges, T 30 (Feb. 8, 2010); ICC, Situation in the Republic of Kenya: Decision
Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an
Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya, IT 181-87, ICC Doc.
ICC-01/09-19-Corr (Mar. 31, 2010); Prosecutor v. Bemba, Case No. ICC-01/05-

01/08-802, Trial Chamber III, Decision on the Admissibility and Abuse of
Process Challenges (June 24, 2010).
44-51. Perhaps the nearest
35. ICC Annual Report, supra note 28,
Schabas comes to substantiating allegations of politicised situation selection is
in relation to the OTP's response on Iraq, where the jurisdiction of the Court is
limited to nationals of States Parties. Schabas, supra note 1, at 549; ICC, OTP
response to communications received concerning Iraq, at 3, 6 (Feb. 9, 2006),
available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/F596DO8D-D810-43A2-99BBB899B9C5BCD2/277422/OTPlettertosendersre_- Iraq_9_February_2006.pd
f [hereinafter OTP response to Iraq]. Schabas argues that the OTP's
conclusions indicate political bias, but he does not seriously engage with the
specific factual and legal analysis conducted. Schabas, supra note 1, at 549. A
review of the OTP response, for example, indicates that it declined to comment
on the legality of the war itself in the absence of an operative provision on
aggression. OTP Response to Iraq, supra, at 4. In relation to the targeting of
civilians and disproportionate attacks, it stated that it had examined the use
of cluster munitions, which are not prohibited per se under the Statute, but
which could be analysed in accordance with Article 8(2)(b)(i) and (iv). Id. at 5;
see Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 8(2)(b)(i), (iv). Examining sixty-four
incidents of potential relevance, the OTP observed that the available
information established that while a considerable number of civilians died or
were injured during the military operations, the available information did not
indicate intentional attacks on a civilian population. OTP response to Iraq,
supra, at 6. With respect to proportionality, in turn, it stated that the
available material was characterized by (1) a lack of information indicating
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Another, more general challenge affecting the Court's
perception and its aspiration to universality, not directly
addressed in Professor's Schabas' article, is the fact that many
situations may remain unaffected by the existence of the ICC
because they simply remain beyond its jurisdictional reach. 36
Many of the petitions to the ICC, for example, relate to request for
it to act beyond its treaty-jurisdiction in instances where decisions
over situation assignment remain in the first place in the hands of
states, that is, non-party states or the Security Council.37 As is
known, outside of its treaty-jurisdiction, the Court can only act if a
state not party to the Rome Statute chooses to opt-in on an ad hoc
basis by declaring that it accepts the exercise of jurisdiction by the
Court (Article 12(3)) or if the Security Council refers a situation
clear excessiveness in relation to military advantage and (2) a lack of
information indicating the involvement of nationals of States Parties, noting
that the available information converged in indicating that ninety-four to
ninety-six percent of air sorties were carried out by non-States Parties. Id. at
6, n.14. The response also stated that it had examined legal arguments that
States Party nationals may have been accessories to crimes committed by
nationals of non-parties, but it ultimately found that the reasonable basis
standard for any form of individual criminal responsibility under Article 25
had not been established. Id. at 3. The OTP found a reasonable basis to
believe that acts of wilful killing and inhuman treatment of civilians within
the jurisdiction of the Court had been committed by nationals of States
Parties. Id. at 8. The Prosecutor's response stated that based on the credible
information available at the time, the information available supported a
reasonable basis for an estimated four to twelve victims of wilful killing and a
limited number of victims of inhuman treatment attributable to nationals of
States Parties, totaling less than twenty persons. Id. In the light of the gravity
of the crimes alleged as well as the existence of complementary national
proceedings in relation to each of those incidents, it decided to decline opening
an investigation, while emphasising its ability to reconsider its conclusions in
the light of new facts or evidence in relation to the alleged facts or to the
alleged forms of direct or indirect participation in war crimes. Id. at 9.
Schabas' observation in relation to the above is to remark "it is common
knowledge that the human suffering in Iraq resulting from war crimes related
to the invasion by the United Kingdom exceeds fifteen or twenty victims!"
Schabas, supra note 1, at 546. Arguably, irrespective of the correctness of the
OTP's conclusions, an issue of such fundamental importance to his underlying
thesis would appear to deserve a more rigorous analysis.
36. Because the ICC is set up by treaty, its scope is limited to the territorial
and personal parameters established by the consent of states. This may be
expressed by their joining the Statute (Article 12(2)), by declaring their ad hoc
consent (Article 12(3)), or vicariously by the Security Council referring a
situation to the Court (Article 13(b)). Rome Statute, supra note 2, arts. 12(2)(3), 13(b). The consent of a non-party state in the latter case is provided by
virtue of its membership of the United Nations Charter, which includes their
agreement to carry out the decisions of the Security Council, pursuant to
Article 25 and Article 103 of the Charter. U.N. Charter arts. 25, 103.
37. See ICC-OTP, Report on the activities performed during the first three
years (June 2003-June 2006), at 9-10 (Sept. 12, 2006) (discussing referrals,
communications, analysis, and investigations of the OTP over the three-year
period).
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(Article 13(b)). In regions such as the Middle East, where the
referral of the Darfur situation has been criticised by some, the
debate is partly directed at the political assessment of the Security
Council in referring one situation over another. At the same time,
it is equally apparent that states of the region have themselves
proved reluctant to bypass such considerations by directly
conferring jurisdiction on the ICC. Because the Security Council
and states are not required to follow any legal criteria in choosing
which situation to refer from the global pool of possible situations,
the resort to accountability via political sanction in these
circumstances has remained conditioned by a set of extra-legal
variables that has rendered the scope for consistency in such
essential processes anxiously imprecise. As the UN SecretaryGeneral has stated:
[T]here remain serious challenges in pursuing accountability. Some
situations which, by any objective analysis, would have warranted
some form of action by the Security Council, have faced serious
obstacles or languished entirely. This has eroded the Council's
credibility. There is a need to address this problem, and to bring
some consistency to the effort.38
Thus, the issue here affects the political choices of states with
respect to situations that are outside of the ICC's treaty
jurisdiction, not the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court itself.

B. Case Selection
The thesis Schabas sets out in Victor's Justice suggests
politics also infiltrates individual case selection: "Even when the
situation has been selected, political choices are also made in
terms of which parties to a conflict are to be targeted for
prosecution." 39 The statement occurs in reference to the fact that
cases have been brought against members of armed groups within
some situations and against members of national armed forces in
others. Does the prosecution of rebels in "self-referred" situations
compared to prosecution of government officials following a
Security Council referral indicate political bias, suggesting victor's
justice?40 Schabas' analysis, while certainly sensational, appears
somewhat perfunctory. It seems plausible that these results can
38. The Secretary-General, Honouring Geneva Conventions, SecretaryGeneral Says Debate 'No Longer between Peace and Justice but between Peace
and What Kind of Justice, SG/SM/12494, L/T/4417, HR/5002 (Sept. 26, 2009).
39. Schabas, supra note 1, at 549.
40. Id. at 544. See also William A. Schabas, Prosecutorial Discretion v.
JudicialActivism at the InternationalCriminal Court, 6 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST.
731, 751 (2008) (stating that "[tihe attention to non-state actors is closely

related to the concept of 'self-referral', which has the practical consequence of
establishing a degree of complicity between the Office of the Prosecutor and
the referring state.").
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also be explained by the factual pattern of allegations in each
situation and a policy of focussing on persons bearing the greatest
responsibility for the most serious crimes: bearing in mind the
allegations of large-scale crimes committed by non-state armed
groups in the DRC, Uganda, and CAR, compared to Darfur where
allegations primarily relate to the conduct of the Sudanese armed
forces and the Militia/Janjaweed. At the same time, rebel crimes
have also been prosecuted in Darfur, 41 and the conduct of national
armed forces examined in other situations. 42 In relation to Kenya,
the assumptions of victor's justice are altogether challenged since
the stated objective is to prosecute individuals associated with
both ruling parties, based on the factual pattern of allegations
arising from the post-election violence: in Kenya there is no
vanquished, both victors are, in fact, being investigated. 43 Thus,
although the Court may need to contribute to greater public
understanding of its work, it is not clear it is being guided by
political calculus. 44
By contrast, other criteria for the opening of situations that
41. See generally Prosecutor v. Garda, Case No. ICC-02/05-02/09-243-Red,
Decision on the Confirmation of Charges (Feb. 8, 2010) (involving one of the
most deadly and large-scale attacks on African Union Mission in Sudan
(AMIS) peacekeepers during the conflict involving rebel fighters on the AMIS
base at Haskanita).
42. The ICC Annual Report notes, for example, current investigations in
Kivu provinces focussing on alleged crimes against a multiplicity of
perpetrators and groups, including the Forces D~mocratiques de Lib6ration du
Rwanda (FDLR), the Congrbs National pour la Defense du Peuple (CNDP), the
national armed forces (FARDC), and the Mai-Mai. ICC Annual Report, supra
note 28, 1 28.
43. See generally ICC, Situation in the Republic of Kenya: Request for
authorisationof an investigationpursuant to Article 15, ICC Doc. ICC-01/09-3
(Nov. 26, 2009); ICC, Situation in the Republic of Kenya: Decision Pursuant to
Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the
Situation in the Republic of Kenya, ICC Doc. ICC-01/09-19 (Mar. 31, 2010)
(indicating that persons associated with both governing political parties would
be investigated).
44. It could be argued that political considerations might have guided
relevant states to refer these situations to the ICC in the first place in
anticipation that cases would focus on rebels; that the decision of Sudan not to
co-operate with the ICC was based on its assessment that the cases would
focus on its own conduct; or that the decision of coalition government in Kenya
not to refer but rather accept the exercise of proprio motu powers was due to
the expectation that cases would focus on both their ruling parties. See, e.g.,
William Burke-White, Complementarity in Practice: The International
Criminal Court as Part of a System of Multi-level Global Governance in the
Democratic Republic of Congo, 18 LEIDEN J. OF INT'L L. at 557-590 (2005)
(discussing self-referral to the ICC). At most, states here might be predicting
the investigative focus of the Prosecutor. This is different, however, from the
suggestion that there has been an agreement to shield certain actors from
accountability, since discretion surrounding case selection rests with the
Prosecutor as guided by the evidence and the ongoing conduct of the different
armed groups and armed forces.
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have been put forward by some would bring political calculus
directly into the equation: positing, for example, the need for less
situations in Africa; more balance between cases against non-state
and state actors; avoidance of politically complicated prosecutions
against sitting heads of state or other senior officials; prosecution
of cases involving Western powers to garner legitimacy; or the
adjustment of the legal process to peace negotiations. 45 Schabas,
while noting the dangers of such subjective assessments, appears
ambivalent on the issue: questioning, for example, the
appropriateness of an equivalence of blame approach to
prosecutions before the IMT at Nuremberg and Tokyo or the
ICTR,46 but suggesting that such an approach might be necessary
to vindicate the legitimacy of the ICC in Uganda and DRC without
explaining the difference; as well as expressing doubt over the
wisdom of prosecuting a head of state in conditions where the
political support for such a case may be uncertain. 47
As recognised in both articles, case selection criteria,
impartially applied, may in fact require uneven outcomes.48 In
situations of mass atrocity, there will often not be equal culpability
between groups. Situations may comprise serious crimes
committed by one side, by both sides, or by a variety of non-state
and state actors. Decisions on case selection in such situations
arguably should be driven by the evidence and the impartial
application of prosecutorial policy, irrespective of how the outcome
45. In relation to the interests of justice under Articles 53(1)(c) and 53(2)(c),
the Office of the Prosecutor has stated that as a matter of interpretation and
policy it does not define this statutory criteria to include the "interests of
peace," suggesting considerations over the impact of its decisions on*other
political processes is a task entrusted under the Statute to other institutions,
notably the Security Council pursuant to Article 16 of the Rome Statute, and
not the Court. Policy Paper on the Interests of Justice, supra note 19, at 1.
Nonetheless, the Prosecutor has also referred to the capacity for investigations
and prosecutions to contribute to prevention and forestall future violence, in
recognition of one of the goals of the preamble to the Rome Statute. See, e.g.,
Press Release, Office of the Prosecutor, ICC Prosecutor: Kenya Can Be an
2009),
http://www.iccthe
World
(Sept.
18,
Example
to
cpi.int/menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/situation%20icc%2001
09/press%20releases/pr452 (emphasizing that Kenya would prove to be an
example of "how to work together with the international community and the
Court to end impunity and prevent future crimes.").
46. See Schabas, supra note 1, at 552 (stating "[so-called problems of evenhanded prosecution, where all sides in a conflict bear the brunt of
prosecutorial attention, are not actually resolved because a sampling of
suspects from one party are pursued in order to defeat the allegation of victor's
justice. The debates continue. . . .").
47. Id. See also infra Part III (analyzing the political as well as legal
ramifications of prosecuting political leaders).
48. Schabas, supra note 1, at 537-40; Brian D. Lepard, How Should the ICC
Prosecutor Exercise His or Her Discretion? The Role of Fundamental Ethical
Principles, 43 JOHN MARSHALL L. REV. 553, 556-58 (2010).
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will be perceived. Impartiality may also require different outcomes
for different groups based on complementarity: if national
authorities are genuinely investigating persons from one group,
the ICC may be required to exclusively focus on the other. 49 This is
not victor's justice, but rather, it is the statutory framework. We
might instinctively prefer, perhaps, for the ICC to investigate all
sides or nothing at all, but the law dictates a more nuanced
system-wide approach: the goal of the Rome Statute is ensure the
enforcement of criminal liability, whether at the national or
international level, not to necessarily ensure litigation before the
ICC. The object is for cases to be genuinely prosecuted and
accountability impartially applied across the system. The breadth
and depth of this impact across all territories will depend on the
rate of universal adherence to the Statute as well as the
consistency of Security Council referrals in relation to non-parties.
Its influence in adjusting behaviour, moreover, will be linked to
the regularity of the law enforcement functions performed by
states on the Court's behalf and the predictability of sanctions for
perpetrators.so

C. Political Guidance
Having presented the argument that the ICC Prosecutor
takes political decision, Professor Schabas asserts that the major
weakness confronting the Court is not the absence of arrests by
states or the challenge of holding trials in the complex procedural
framework of the ICC, but rather the Prosecutor himself: he is too
independent and lacks political guidance. 51 This is contrasted with
"[t]he ad hoc tribunals, and Nuremberg and Tokyo before them,
succeeded not only because of the political forces that established
them, but also due to the political consensus that supported their
work." 52 As Schabas observes:

49. See infra Part II (outlining a more detailed discussion on ex ante
standards).
50. See infra Part III (analyzing the political as well as legal ramifications

of prosecutions under the ICC).
51. Professor Schabas previously argued that the ICC Prosecutor was not
independent enough, suggesting that, for all the battles fought in Rome over
prosecutorial independence, the exercise of proprio motu powers had become
an "issue that has thus far proved to be of little importance." William Schabas,
International Criminal Court's success,
the
The
enigma of
http://www.opendemocracy.net/globalizationinstitutionsgovernment/icc_3278j
sp (last visited Sept. 17, 2010). In the present paper Schabas appears to argue
the reverse: recognising the significant role played by Article 15 powers to
incentivise state co-operation and referrals and in determining whether to
proceed on the basis of a Security Council referral, but asserting that the
problem is that the Prosecutor is too independent and needs to be reined in.
Schabas, supra note 1, at 541-42.
52. Id. at 550.
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The most famous of the cases, Milosevic and Taylor, were only able
to proceed because of widespread political backing in the regions
affected by the conflicts for the idea that they be brought to justice.
In the most celebrated case to come before the ICC, that of Omar AlBashir, such support is weak or entirely absent in the part of the
world where it is most needed.
It is submitted in this Article that it is the lack of political direction
to the Prosecutor that has contributed significantly to making the
work of the Court so complicated. Precisely for this reason, at least
in part, it is a poor performer when compared with the other
international criminal tribunals. 53
Notwithstanding the statutory authority for the Prosecutor to
proceed proprio motu within the confines of the Court's treaty
jurisdiction, the Darfur situation and its resultant cases, recalled
by Schabas above, actually follow the framework he proposes. The
situation in Darfur was not opened by the Prosecutor on his own
initiative, but rather was referred by the Security Council acting
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the same basis upon which
the ICTY and ICTR were established. As with the ad hoc
Tribunals, individual case selection decisions were determined by
the Prosecutor's Office, not the Security Council. 54 The Council has
not determined thereafter that the cases selected by the
Prosecutor constitute a threat to international peace and security
warranting suspension of proceedings pursuant to Article 16 of the
Rome Statute. The Darfur referral was, in fact, adopted under
Chapter VII as a measure contributing to international peace and
security, and the Security Council later recalled the need for full
co-operation with the Court.55 In terms of ventilation of
expectations and promotion of predictability, moreover, the
Prosecutor reports to the Security Council on the progress of its
activities every six months.56 Contrary to the above, the major

53. Id. at 550-51.

54. More generally, the paper at times appears to mix issues affecting
situations and cases interchangeably. See generally id.
55. S. C. Res. 1593, U.N. Doc. No. S/RES/1593 (Mar. 31, 2005); see
Statement by the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2008/21

(June 16, 2008) (stating that "[t]he Security Council recalls its decision, under
Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, in resolution 1593 (2005) that the
Government of Sudan and all other parties to the conflict in Darfur shall cooperate fully with and provide any necessary assistance to the International
Criminal Court and the Prosecutor pursuant to that resolution, while
stressing the principle of complementarity of the International Criminal
Court" and "urges the Government of Sudan and all other parties to the
conflict in Darfur to cooperate fully with the Court, consistent with resolution
1593 (2005), in order to put an end to impunity for the crimes committed in
Darfur.").
56. S. C. Res. 1593, T 8, U.N. Doc. No. S/RES/1593 (Mar. 31, 2005).
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challenge appears to be and remains the responsibility of states in
effecting the arrest of persons sought by the Court: a challenge
common to other international criminal courts and tribunals.5 7
Although the Council has not questioned the investigations
and prosecutions by the Prosecutor in relation to Darfur, Professor
Schabas focuses on the position adopted by the African Union
(AU), whose approach toward the Court is reportedly driven by
several notable detractors of the Court, including the Sudan and
Libya.58 The article appears to suggest that the Prosecutor should
take political guidance from the AU as much as from the Security
Council, the reason being: "why should the Security Council have
the monopoly?" The statement ignores several obvious points, not
least of which is the fact that the exceptional availability of Article
16 under the Rome Statute reflects the Security Council's role in
determining a threat to international peace and security under the
UN Charter system.5 9 The AU position, moreover, appears to
reflect political rather than legal rhetoric, masking as the differing
views of individual African states over their statutory obligations
toward the ICC that remain unaffected by the decisions of the
AU.60 Calls for the AU or the UN General Assembly to be given
57. Professor Schabas does not explain why the alleged lack of political
guidance results in the slow performance of the ICC. While political support
will be critical to enforce arrest warrants, it is not clear how it bears relevance
to the pace of judicial proceedings inside the courtroom, which instead to date
has been affected by issues related to disclosure, witness protection and
victims participation, a unique confirmation process, prosecution and defence
litigation strategies, and interlocutory appeals. See infra Part III (analyzing
the political as well as legal ramifications of prosecuting political leaders).
58. Schabas, supra note 1, at 551. See generally Sixteenth Ordinary Session
of the Executive Council of the African Union, Report on the Ministerial
PreparatoryMeeting on the Rome Statute of the InternationalCriminal Court
(ICC), Assembly/AU/Dec.245(XIII), EX.CL/568 (XVI) (Jan. 25-29, 2010).
59. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 16.
60. As one commentator has observed:
Africa is not united behind al-Bashir. While there are powerful interests
within the AU willing to protect Sudan's President, the 'African position'
on the ICC is contested and by no means monochromatic. The most
strident backbencher is Botswana-it has made it clear that Gabarone
remains committed to assisting the ICC and to honouring the country's
obligations to arrest al-Bashir if he comes to its territory. South Africa
too-with urging from civil society-has stressed on more than one
occasion that it will honour its legal obligations to the ICC if al-Bashir
were to land here, going so far as to confirm that an arrest warrant for
al-Bashir has been issued by a Pretoria Magistrate in compliance with
our treaty duties. A failure to recognise the various shades of the
relationship between the Court and Africa's capitals is unhelpful. This
oversimplification, reminiscent of a general predisposition within the
West to treat Africa en bloc, should be resisted: it plays directly into the
hands of certain African politicians who are keen to present the ICC as
anti-Africa, and Africa as anti-ICC.
Max du Plessis, The African Union, the InternationalCriminal Court and al-
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the same powers as the Security Council, moreover, appear to be
less about democratizing the Article 16 process, and more about
restricting the ability of the ICC to pursue cases against certain
high officials, having as their origin discussions over mechanisms
to stay the Bashir case. 61
While acknowledging the unacceptable nature of the proposal,
Professor Schabas nonetheless asserts, "Certainly an answer has
to be found, so that the selection of situations by the Prosecutor
rests on solid political judgment that finds support from States
Parties and, preferably, the broader international community,
rather than on the pretence that this is a judicial matter devoid of
politics." The answer appears to be located in the Rome Statute
and the UN Charter, namely, either: (i) within the confines of the
Court's treaty-based jurisdiction, the Prosecutor can proceed via a
State Party referral or proprio motu because ICC States Parties
(or non-party states lodging a declaration) have given their prior
consent to the exercise of jurisdiction by accepting the treaty
regime; 62 or (ii) the Prosecutor can proceed on the basis of a
Security Council referral adopted under Chapter VII of the UN
Charter, which creates mandatory obligations for affected Member
States by virtue of their membership of the Charter system. 63 In
the situation in Darfur there is no more compelling system for the
establishment of international jurisdiction. Unless we would want
the Security Council to also select the cases for prosecution, an
outcome that was roundly rejected during the negotiations of the
Rome Statute, 64 it appears evident that individual case selection
decisions must be taken by an independent prosecutor on the basis
of the available evidence.6 5
STUD.,
SECURITY
INST.
FOR
to
Kenya,
visit
Bashir's
See, e.g., Republic of South
http://www.iss.co.za/iss-today.php?ID=1025.
Africa Department of International Relations and Cooperation, Notes
following the Briefing of Department InternationalRelations and Cooperation's
http://www.dfa.gov.za/docs/
Ntsaluba,
Ayanda
Director-General,
speeches/2009/ntsaO731.html (noting in answer to questions: "If today
President Bashir landed in the country, in terms of the provisions of our law
he would have to be arrested.") (last visited Oct. 17, 2010).
61. Id.
62. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 12(2)-(3); ICC RPE, supra note 7, Rule
44.

63. U.N. Charter arts. 25, 39-51, 103.
64. The only way in which the Security Council could potentially affect case
selection decisions is by adopting a resolution pursuant Article 16; although
this would only suspend proceedings for renewable twelve-month period, it
would not deprive the Court of jurisdiction per se. Rome Statute, supra note 2,
art. 16.
65. The premise of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1593 is that the Court
will exercise its jurisdiction pursuant to Article 13(b) and will apply the legal
regime set out under the Rome Statute, meaning that case selection decisions
are left within the purview of the ICC. See generally S.C. Res. 1593. At the
same time, the Security Council would have been conscious of the possible
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ExANTE STANDARDS

Rather than politics, Professor Brian Lepard approaches the
issues from the perspective of ex ante standards: examining the
role of fundamental ethical principles in guiding decisions over the
initiation of situations for investigation and cases for prosecution.
Professor Lepard identifies certain key principles logically related
to the preeminent principle of "unity in diversity," which he finds
reflected in the preamble of the Rome Statute.6 6 Principle among
these is respect for the law, which requires the Prosecutor to be
faithful to those standards laid down in the Statute itself for the
exercise of his discretion and evaluation, particularly in relation to
terms that enjoy only marginal definition in the treaty text, such
as "gravity," "the interests of justice," and "the interests of
victims." Outlining a four-step methodology toward treaty
interpretation, the last step favours, in case of remaining
ambiguity, interpretations that best help to implement the
fundamental ethical principles identified.6 7 Application of these
principles leads him to propose that the ICC Prosecutor should
focus on incidents of violence related to the most serious
commission of crimes with the jurisdiction of the Court. It also
suggests an approach to gathering information and evidence based
on the principle of open-minded consultation, meaning seeking out
information and opinions from diverse sources without
preconceived notions in relation to crimes, and ascertaining the
perspectives of different constituencies on selection decisions.
Lepard argues that the consultation principle, moreover, implies
the transparent communication of prosecutorial decision to the
general public in order to build and sustain political trust and
enhance the Court's legitimacy, thereby tempering suspicions over
political bias. The article suggests credence should be given to the
linkage between peace and justice, both for the purpose of defining
the interests of justice and in considering the deterrent potential
of prosecutions. Finally, he suggests the statutory duties of
independence and impartiality should lead the Prosecutor to
determine case selection decisions not on the basis of perceptions,
for example, the concern to balance prosecutions between rival

levels of criminal responsibility resulting from an investigation by the ICC
given its prior examination of the report of the International Commission of
Inquiry on Darfur (S/2005/60), which is recalled in the opening paragraph of
the resolution; S.C. Res. 1593.
66. Lepard, supra note 48, at 560.
67. The four step methodology Lepard outlines requires recourse by: (1)
teleological and literal interpretations of the treaty provisions; (2)
supplementary means, including by resort to the travaux; (3) the existence of
new generally accepted understandings; and (4) interpretations of treaties
that best help to implement fundamental ethical problems if ambiguities
remain. Id. at 561.
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groups, but rather in light of their impact on fundamental ethical
principles: suggesting recourse should be made to ethics in
particular to explain prosecutorial decisions where the judicial
criteria appear indeterminate.6 8
The discussion over ex ante standards with which Lepard's
article engages arises from the demands of selection. Faced with a
situation of mass atrocity, the factual crime base may involve
widespread acts of murder, rape, torture, destruction of property,
and forced displacement. The gamut of criminal liability may run
from foot soldiers who physically perpetrated the crime, to the
superior who directed the operation, to the military commander or
political and business elite who masterminded and controlled their
overall commission. Liability may also attach to support networks
materially assisting perpetrators or contributing to the
commission of crimes and fugitive flight. Victims may number in
the tens or hundreds of thousands or, in the case of displacement,
millions. Since comprehensive capture is impossible, selection
becomes necessary.
Such questions do not normally arise in the same manner at
the national level. Notwithstanding the scope for prosecutorial
discretion domestically, there is normally the expectation that a
serious crime reported to the police will be investigated and,
evidence permitting, suspects will be brought to justice. In the
face of large-scale violence, by contrast, it remains an
uncomfortable reality that not every act of killing, rape, or torture
will be investigated or face judicial sanction, even where evidence
is readily available and perpetrators identifiable. In this sense, the
need for selection in the prosecution of atrocity crimes represents
the most pressing and ethically challenging imperative in the task
of bringing law to bear on situations of massive violence.
International courts and tribunals must decide when and where
they will direct the focus of their activities and be prepared to
explain how they arrived at those choices.69 Although differences
of opinions will perforce persist over the selection of individual
prosecution targets, to garner legitimacy the process and
methodology must be applied in a manner that is reasonable,
based on established legal and policy criteria, and subject to
overarching principles that demonstrate fairness. Selection must
not lead to selectivity, resulting in arbitrariness or bias.70

68. Lepard, supra note 48, at 566-67.
69. No international court will carry the entire burden of course, since it
will always exercise concurrent jurisdiction with national courts.
International institutions will also not bear a corollary human rights
obligation to that owed by states to provide victims with a right to an effective
remedy.
70. Allison Marston Danner, Enhancing the Legitimacy and Accountability
of ProsecutorialDiscretion at the International CriminalCourt, 97 AM. J. INT'L
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Looking at the practice of international courts and tribunals
they have, either as a matter of law, policy, or evolving practice,
tended toward a prosecutorial focus on the top echelons of criminal
activity and on the most serious criminal episodes. 7' Practice has
L. 510 (2003); Fabricio Guariglia, The selection of cases by the Office of the
Prosecutorof the International Criminal Court, in THE EMERGING PRACTICE
OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 209-17 (Carsten Stahn & Goran

Sluiter eds., 2009); James Goldston, More Candour about Criteria: The
Exercise of Discretion by the Prosecutor of the InternationalCriminal Court, 8
J. INT'L CRIM. JUSTICE 383, 383-406 (2010); Lepard, supra note 48, at 564-65.
71. Thus, the proceedings before the International Military Tribunals at
Nuremberg focussed on "major criminals whose offences have no particular
geographical location and who will be punished by the joint decision of the
Governments of the Allies," while others "responsible for or have taken a
consenting part in the above atrocities, massacres and executions will be sent
back to the countries in which their abominable deeds were done in order that
they may be judged and punished according to the laws of these liberated
countries and of free governments which will be erected therein." Charter of
the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S.
279, available at http://avalon.law.yale.edulimt/imtconst.asp [hereinafter
Nuremberg Charter]; Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the
Major War Criminal of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 280,
Declaration
http://avalon.law.yale.edulimt/imtchart.asp;
available at
Concerning Atrocities Made at the Moscow Conference, Oct. 30, 1943,
available at http://avalon.law.yale.edulwwiilmoscow.asp; Charter of the
International Military Tribunal for the Far East art. 1, Jan. 19, 1946, TIAS
No. 1589, 4 Bevans 20 (as amended Apr. 26, 1946, 4 Bevans 27), available at
http://www.jus.uio.no/treaties/04/4-06/military-tribunal-far-east.xml
[hereinafter Tokyo Charter]. Also, see S. C. Res. 1534, TT 5-6, U.N. Doc. No.
S/RES/1534 (Mar. 26, 2004), adopted as part of completion strategies of the
ICTY and ICTR, calling on both Tribunals to concentrate pending indictments
on 'the most senior leaders suspected of being most responsible for crimes
within the jurisdiction of the relevant Tribunal . . ." and to proceed with "the
transfer of cases involving intermediate and lower rank accused to competent
national jurisdictions . . . ." The majority of perpetrators from these situations
are today being proceeded against at the national level in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, and Rwanda. See also Statute for the Special
Court of Sierra Leone art. 1, S.C. Res. 1315, U.N. Doc. S/RES/915 (Aug. 14,
2000) (stating that "[t]he Special Court shall ... have the power to prosecute
persons who bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations of
international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law committed in the
territory of Sierra Leone since 30 November 1996, including those leaders
who, in committing such crimes, have threatened the establishment of and
implementation of the peace process in Sierra Leone."); Law on the
Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers, with inclusion of amendments
as promulgated on 27 October 2004 art. 1, NS/RKM/1004/006 (Oct. 27, 2004)
(stating that "[tihe purpose of this law is to bring to trial senior leaders of
Democratic Kampuchea and those who were most responsible for the crimes
and serious violations of Cambodian penal law, international humanitarian
law and custom, and international conventions recognized by Cambodia, that
were committed during the period from 17 April 1975 to 6 January 1979."); see
generally Morten Bergsmo (ed.), Criteriafor Prioritizingand Selecting Core
International Crimes Cases, F. FOR INT'L AND HUMANITARIAN L., Publication
No. 4 (2009) (comparing case selection criteria).
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famously varied, of course, in the treatment of opposing parties to
the conflict. The epitaph of victor's justice at Nuremberg was only
partly redeemed by Justice Jackson's opening statement that the
law must be applied in the cases before it with detachment and
intellectual integrity. 72 The exclusion of Allied crimes before the
Nuremburg and Tokyo Tribunal was less a matter of prosecutorial
policy, but of law, this being ruled-out as a matter of jurisdiction. 73
Contemporary international courts have typically been established
on a more level playing field: substantive decisions on case
selection being left to the exercise of prosecutorial discretion
rather than being dictated a prioriby the legislator.7 4 Nonetheless,
the choice of individual cases has continued to stoke controversy:
criticism at various times accusing international courts of either
engaging in uneven and biased prosecutions or, conversely, of
painting with too broad a brush by suggesting an equivalence of
blame between rival parties, thereby blurring relative levels of
culpability.
Both articles by Schabas and Lepard raise fundamental
questions over how international prosecutors should select cases
for prosecution from a large universe of potential cases. The
results of selection will always be unsatisfactory because not every
crime will be prosecuted. The question is whether consensus can
be generated on the most appropriate criteria and methodology to
be applied. Should every side be prosecuted, as broadly attempted
before the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) and to some
extent the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
72. Robert H. Jackson, Chief of Counsel for the United States, Opening
PUB.
BROAD.
SERV.,
Nuremberg
Trials,
Statement
http://www.pbs.org/wnet/supremecourt/personality/sources-documentl2.html
(last visted Oct. 17, 2010).
73. Nuremberg Charter, supra note 71, arts. 6-12; Tokyo Charter, supra
note 71, art. 5.
74. The Special Tribunal for Lebanon appears to be an exception given that
it was established to hear primarily a single case, namely "persons responsible
for the attack of 14 February 2005 resulting in the death of former Lebanese
Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and in the death or injury of other persons."
Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon art. 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1757
(2007). Debates over the selection of temporal scope for the ICTR and SCSL,
moreover, demonstrate that determinations on jurisdictional parameters may
also result from political choices as to the period of history that is subjected to
judicial scrutiny. Before the ICC, although the Rome Statute does not allow a
referring party to limit jurisdiction to particular cases or parties to a conflict,
some situations may be circumscribed as a matter of jurisdiction, meaning
that the Court may only have jurisdiction with respect to certain nationals
(Article 12(2)(b)), certain categories of crimes (Article 124), or certain temporal
parameters (Articles 11, 12(3), 13(b)). Rome Statute, supra note 2, arts.
12(2)(b), 124. For a more detailed discussion see Rod Rastan, Situation and
Case: Defining the Parameters,in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND
COMPLEMENTARITY: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE (Carsten Stahn & Mohamed
El Zeidy eds., forthcoming 2011).
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Yugoslavia (ICTY), or should a distinction be made based on
relative culpability, as before the International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda (ICTR)? Should the critical factor in fact be the
impartial application of selection criteria irrespective of outcomes?
This might result in persons from Group A being prosecuted to the
exclusion of individuals from Group B who do not meet the same
criteria. Should an international court be concerned at all with
appearance of bias and its impact on its perceived legitimacy?7 5 If
so, should such considerations influence case selection policy? As
with any serious high profile case at the national level, the effects
of legal determinations will be felt in the political arena. Should a
court, while alive to such realities, be shaped by them? If we
adjust legal criteria to accommodate political considerations,
where should it stop? How does a judicial body avoid the risk of
engaging in politics? If we reject the relevance of political impact
on prosecutorial discretion how should a court respond' to
legitimate expectations for universal redress?
The resolution of these issues revolves to some extent around
our expectations of the judicial process. We want international
courts to dispense justice according to sound ethical principles.
This suggests that prosecutorial policy should be based on
objective criteria that examine the evidence in each case on its
own merits. At the same time, due to the traditional prevalence of
a culture of impunity, the uniqueness of leadership trials in
situations of mass atrocities endows them with profound
sociological import. Individual prosecutions resonate beyond the
factual parameters of the specific case. They frame historical
events in normative parameters. For societies brutalized by the
accumulated patterns of violence, trials can serve vital expressive
functions by identifying and individualising guilt and reaffirming
ingrained instincts toward justice. The representational function
of leadership trials may be undermined if some, but not all, parties
to a conflict are prosecuted, even if some groups warrant trial but
not others.
Which is the valid response? Should prosecutors focus solely
on the law and follow wherever the evidence leads them, or should
they consider the broader narrative of which they will inevitably
75. On the functions of legitimacy, see Danner, supra note 70
(demonstrating how the ICC Court and its Prosecutor can operate in ways
that will enhance their legitimacy); Alexander Greenawalt, Justice Without
Politics? ProsecutorialDiscretion and the International Criminal Court, 39
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 583, 583-673 (2007) (proposing a pragmatic model of
prosecutorial discretion that seeks to satisfy conditions of legitimacy and to
reconcile the concerns of the Court's supporters and detractors); Margaret M.
deGuzman, Gravity and the Legitimacy of the International Criminal Court,
32 FORDHAM INT'L. L.J. 1400, 1435-49 (2009) (demonstrating accounts of
legitimacy to demonstrate the relationship between gravity and the ICC's
actual and perceived legitimacy).
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form a part? The issue is not simply one of fairness, but fairness
toward which value: toward the impartial application of the law
and the objective evidence-gathering process, or toward the will
and needs of society? In view of the volatile contexts in which
international criminal proceedings occur, should other factors be
considered? What of the impact of prosecutions on peace and
security or the incentive for negotiators to arrive at a mediated
settlement? Will trials inflame tensions or contribute toward
prevention? How should the goals of international criminal justice
be prioritised in view of retribution, deterrence, persuasion,
rehabilitation, and restoration? The . exercise of prosecutorial
discretion in these areas will inevitably be highly contested and be
subject to competing value claims. While consensus might more
easily galvanise
against blanket selectivity, case-by-case
assessments will inevitably generate differences over the
appropriate application of selection criteria. The question of
selection relates also to the overall effectiveness of a global
criminal justice regime that relies on complementary action by
national courts. So long as an international court remains the only
practically effective forum to hear crimes arising from a situation
of mass atrocity, choices over case selection will attract
particularly intense scrutiny. Part of the challenge, therefore, is to
operationalise the ever-present
need for complementary
mechanisms involving other international and state-level
institutions to enable more complex and multifaceted responses to
crimes.7 6
Professor Lepard suggests that prosecutorial policy should be
guided by ex ante standards founded on sound ethical principles
rather than the shifting sands of the political process. The
application of such standards should, in turn, elicit public
articulation over how they have been implemented in practice.7 7
As demonstrated by Professor Schabas' article, the reasoning
process is nonetheless likely to invite its own critique: by either
creating an expectation that every determination must be publicly
justified or, conversely, that the public elaboration of ex ante
standards and explanations of their implementation may be
received as disingenuous.78 The value of such an exercise,
therefore, should be considered for its own intrinsic worth-as
guidelines for internal prosecutorial policy and to promote external
transparency.
Examining the fundamental ethical principles articulated in
76. Rod

Rastan,

Complementarity-Contest or

Collaboration?, in

COMPLEMENTARITY AND THE EXERCISE OF UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION FOR CORE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMES, FICHL Publication Series No. 7 (M. Bergsmo ed.,
2010).

77. Lepard, supra note 48, at 564-65.
78. Schabas, supra note 1, at 549.
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Professor Lepard's article, a number find support in the governing
text of the Rome Statute. The principle of independence, for
example, requires the Office of the Prosecutor not to seek or act on
instructions from any external source.7 9 It would arguably also
require that it is not influenced by the presumed or known wishes
of any party or by the co-operation seeking process (that is,
concern over the maintenance of ongoing co-operation from a
particular national authority).8 0 Independence, moreover, means
that the case selection decisions should remain unaffected by the
manner in which a situation is triggered, whether by a State Party
or Security Council referral or proprio motu. Thus, for example,
where a referral or its accompanied supporting documentation
identifies potential suspects or the responsibility of particular
parties to a conflict, this should have no bearing on the direction of
any future investigations and on case selection decisions.8 1
Impartiality, also identified by Lepard, would require the
Office of the Prosecutor to extend its investigations to cover all
facts and evidence relevant to an assessment of criminal
responsibility, and, in doing so, investigate incriminating and
exonerating circumstances equally. 82 It also suggests that the
Prosecutor should apply consistent methods and criteria
irrespective of the persons or groups concerned. Thus, an initial
case hypothesis that forms the basis for a particular line of inquiry
should be continuously revised in light of evidence collected, the
evolution of the case theory and attendant modes of liability, and
the sufficiency of crime base and linkage evidence. 83 As noted in
both articles and as discussed above, impartiality does not mean
"equivalence of blame," and may, in fact, require different
outcomes for different actors within a situation. The concept of
impartiality, moreover, is linked to non-discrimination and

79. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art 42(1).
80. Guariglia, supra note 70, at 212-13.
81. Thus, for example, while the Government of Uganda defined the scope
of its referral as related to the Lord's Resistance Army, the Office of the
Prosecutor clarified with the Government of Uganda that it would examine
allegations concerning all parties to the conflict. See ICC, Situation in
Uganda:Decision Assigning the Situation in Uganda to Pre-TrialChamber II,
ICC-02/04-1 (July 5, 2004) (annexing a letter from the Prosecutor to the
President of the Court on the scope of the referral). The same independence
would apply with respect to the lists of suspects submitted to the Office of the
Prosecutor by the United Nations International Commission of Inquiry for
Darfur and by the Commission of Inquiry into the Post-Election Violence in
Kenya. See generally ICC RPE, supra note 7, Rule 44 (rectifying the
uncertainty created by the inconsistent drafting of Articles 12(2)-(3) by
clarifying that the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court applies with respect to
all crimes of relevance to the situation); Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 12(3);
ICC PRE, supra note 6, Rule 44.
82. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art 54(1).
83. See OTP Regulations, supra note 20, Reg. 35(4).
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equality before the law, meaning that the Office of the Prosecutor
should consider all persons equally regardless of their background
or affiliation, and not draw any adverse distinction founded on
grounds prohibited under the Rome Statute. 84
The principle of open-minded consultation as identified by
Professor Lepard resonates with the duty of the Prosecutor to
obtain the interests of victims when considering the interests of
justice pursuant to Article 53(1)(c). It also forms a necessary
corollary to the power of the Prosecutor at the preliminary
examination stage to seek additional information from states,
organs of the United Nations, intergovernmental or nongovernmental organizations, or other reliable sources.8 5
At the same time, it should be recalled that any prosecutorial
guidelines for the selection of cases will be dependent also on a
number of practical considerations aimed at ensuring effective
investigations and prosecutions. Thus, an initial case hypothesis
may need to be adjusted in order to limit the number of counts or
incidents that are the subject of investigations based on the
availability of evidence as well as strategic decisions aimed at
securing arrest and surrender.8 6 The exercise of discretion in such
matters will be dependent therefore on the facts and
circumstances of each case.
Looking more broadly at the preliminary examination stage,
as emphasised in both articles, the fact that the ICC can
determine not only cases but also situations heightens by several
orders of magnitude the import of prosecutorial independence and
the Court's supervisory powers. This responsibility and the
potential scope of the Court's jurisdiction elicits from Professor
Schabas a profound disbelief over the viability of legal criteria or
ex ante policy standards to regulate situation assignment or case
selection.8 7 It is nonetheless worth recalling that the goal of the
Rome Statute is not for the ICC to respond to all serious crimes.
The treaty creates a model for complementary enforcement by an
assumption of shared responsibilities between the ICC and
national criminal jurisdictions.8 8 As the preamble of the Statute
provides, "it is the duty of every State to exercise its criminal
jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes," while
the ICC is established to be "complementary to national criminal

84. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art 21(3). This should be distinguished
from situations where the Court's jurisdiction may be based solely on the
nationality of the persons concerned pursuant to Article 12(2)(b) of the
Statute. Id. art. 12(2)(b).
85. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art 15(2); ICC RPE, supra note 7, Rule 104.
86. See Rod Rastan, What is a 'case'forthe purpose of the Rome Statute?, 19
CRIM. L.F. 435, 446-48 (2008).
87. See generally Schabas, supra note 1.
88. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 1.
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jurisdictions."89 In this sense, complementarity is not just about
states preserving their right to investigate and prosecute crimes
domestically within the strict meaning of Article 17, but also their
primary responsibility to do so in line with the broader goals of the
preamble.90 Thus, while the ICC has vast territorial and personal
reach, the goal of the Statute is not to necessarily secure
proceedings before the ICC, but to put an end to impunity for such
crimes, preferably through genuine efforts being undertaken at
the national level. 91
Thus, the relationship established between the ICC and
national authorities under the Rome Statute differs fundamentally
from compliance models under previous treaty regimes, such as
the traditional system of self-regulation exemplified by the Hague
Regulations or the grave breaches regime of the Geneva
Conventions. Rather than relying on the reciprocal interests of the
contracting parties for the fulfillment of their treaty obligations, a
model that relied principally on symmetrical warfare between
relatively homogeneous states, the Rome Statute creates a system
of incentives and coercion whose principal strength lies in is its
capacity to catalyse domestic compliance. The authority of the
Court to assert jurisdiction where a state fails to genuinely
exercise it pre-existing duty to investigate and prosecute can serve
as a powerful incentive for domestic activism. Evidence for this
assertion comes from the statements of governments during their
own internal adoption process expressly declaring their intention
to exhaustively capture the requirement of the Rome Statute so as
to ensure the successful assertion of national jurisdiction
whenever required. 92 It is also apparent from the position of the
89. Rome Statute, supra note 2, pmbl. TT 4, 6, art. 1.
90. See, e.g., ICC Review Conference, Complementarity, 9th plen. mtg. at
1-2, RC/Res.1 (June 8, 2010) (stating that the Review Conference"[r]ecognizes
the primary responsibility of States to investigate and prosecute the most
serious crimes of international concern" and "[e]mphasizes the principle of
complementarity as laid down in the Rome Statute and stresses the
obligations of States Parties flowing from the Rome Statute.") (emphasis in
original).
5, 10-11.
91. Rome Statute, supra note 2, pmbl.
92. See, for example, the explanation by the Solicitor-General on the
International Criminal Court Bill before the UK House of Commons Standing
Committee, H.C., Standing Committee D (May 3, 2001) available at
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200001/cmstand/d/st0lO503/pm/l
0503s04.htm (stating that "[w]e want to ensure that United Kingdom courts
can always investigate allegations against a British national so that the ICC
cannot have jurisdiction."). Realists could argue that powerful states have
designed international rules and procedures to preserve their own flexibility,
by ensuring that complementarity will always favour deference to the
domestic courts of well functioning developed states, while weaker, lessdeveloped states will be penalised by the "genuineness" standard. This,
however, looks only to the issue of forum selection; it disregards the fact that
actual compliance will nonetheless be necessary by states to whom jurisdiction
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competent authorities in situations currently under preliminary
examination, referring to their intention to institute genuine
domestic proceedings. 93 The catalytic presence of the Court on the
international stage thus offers the possibility to alter incentive
structures at the national level, thereby increasing prospects for
actual compliance.
Clearly, the ICC will not be able to catalyse genuine domestic
proceedings in all situations. States may be unwilling, unable, or
simply inactive. 94 The task of selecting which situations to open for
investigation will therefore fall back on the statutory criteria
established by Article 53(1) of the Rome Statute, requiring the
establishment of a reasonable basis to believe a crime within the
jurisdiction of the Court has been or is being committed (material,
temporal, and either territorial or personal jurisdiction); the
forming of a preliminary determination on admissibility, involving
an assessment of complementarity and gravity; and consideration
of whether the interests of justice militate against the opening of
investigations. If these criteria are fulfilled, the Statute asserts
that the Prosecutor "shall initiate an investigation." 95 The main
discretionary outlet that applies at the situation stage is if the
has been deferred, and that the genuineness of such proceedings will be
subject to ICC oversight.
93. See, e.g., Press Release, Office of the Prosecutor, Guinea Minister visits
the ICC-Prosecutor Requests Information on National Investigations into 28
September Violence (Oct. 21, 2009) (quoting Guinean Foreign Minister
Alexandre Cece Loua that he is "ready and willing" to proceed with the OTP in
investigating alleged crimes).
94. See Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07-1497, Judgment
on the Appeal of Mr. Germain Katanga against the Oral Decision of Trial
Chamber II of 12 June 2009 on the Admissibility of the Case, 1 78 (Sept. 25,
2009) (establishing a two-stage approach to assessing complementarity,
involving first the question of State inaction, followed by an assessment of
unwillingness or inability only where national proceedings exist); Darryl
Robinson, The Mysterious Mysteriousness of Complementarity, 21 CRIM. L.F. 1,
67-102 (2010) (discussing the inactivity scenario).
95. "The Prosecutor shall, having evaluated the information made available
to him or her, initiate an investigation unless he or she determines that there
is no reasonable basis to proceed under this Statute." Rome Statute, supra
note 2, art. 53(1). "If the Prosecutor concludes that there is a reasonable basis
to proceed with an investigation, he or she shall submit to the Pre-Trial
Chamber a request for authorization of an investigation, together with any
supporting material collected." Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 15(3). See also
ICC RPE, supra note 7, Rules 48, 104 (remedying the apparent difference in
wording between Article 15 and Article 53 by clarifying that the Prosecutor is
to apply the same factors and conduct its evaluation in the same manner at
the Article 15 and Article 53 stage); John Holmes, Jurisdiction and
Admissibility, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: ELEMENTS OF CRIMES
AND RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE 331 (Roy Lee ed., 2001); Hakan
Friman, Investigation and Prosecution, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT: ELEMENTS OF CRIMES AND RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE 49496 (Roy Lee ed., 2001).
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Prosecutor decides that an investigation is not in the interests of
justice. The discretionary quality of this assessment is pronounced
by the last sentence of Article 53(1) and Article 53(3)(b) that
stipulate that decisions taken on the sole basis of the interests of
justice may be reviewed by the Pre-Trial Chamber on its own
initiative and may be overturned.96 By contrast, determinations
with respect to the other stipulated factors (jurisdiction and
admissibility) do not appear to be discretionary-if they are
fulfilled, the Prosecutor is required to proceed.9 7 This institutional
design appears to have been crafted to establish an objective
process leading to the opening of investigations based on the
fulfillment of ex ante criteria. Thus, compared to case selection
where the Office of the Prosecutor is presumed to enjoy broad
discretion in identifying cases from a large pool of possible
suspects and conduct, 98 the selection function at the situation
stage is more narrowly circumscribed and the discretion outlet
more closely regulated.99
Any decision taken by the ICC to open a situation or to
96. It should be recalled that the ability of the PTC to review a decision
based solely on the interests of justice is limited to referrals, pursuant to the
last sentence of Article 53(1), and does not apply to a decision taken under
Article 15(6). Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 53(1). This is why Rule 48
segregates "the factors set out in article 53, paragraph 1 (a) to (c)" and does
not replicate Article 53, 1 1 in its entirety. ICC RPE, supra note 7, Rule 48.
This differentiation in review powers is also borne out by the Rule 105, which
distinguishes between the procedure following a decision not to proceed with
an investigation pursuant to a referral compared to the procedure following a
decision under Article 15(6). See Friman, supra note 95, at 496-98 (noting in
the drafting history the lengthy discussions and ultimate rejection of the
possibility for review powers over negative proprio motu decisions).
97. Such a reading suggests that, notwithstanding the apparent difference
in wording between Article 53(1) and Article 15(3), which was largely
harmonized during the drafting of the rules, a unitary standard should be
applied across Article 53 and Article 15 with respect to the duty to open
investigations once the statutory criteria have been met, meaning this would
apply in equal manner irrespective of the triggering procedure. Rome Statute,
supra note 2, arts. 53(1)(a)-(c); compare Morten Bergsmo & Jelena Pejic,
Article 15, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT (Otto Triffterer ed., 2008) and Morten Bergsmo and Pieter
Kruger, Article 53, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (Otto Triffterer ed., 2008) with deGuzman,
supra note 75, at 1410-1411.
98. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Bemba, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08-453, Decision
on Request for Leave to Submit Amicus Curiae Observations Pursuant to Rule
103 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, T 10 (July 17, 2009) (observing
that issues of case selection and prosecutorial policy are not matters that are
dealt with by the Chamber).
99. To the extent that this evaluation will nonetheless continue to require
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in defining what is "gravity" for the
purpose of Article 53(1)(b) or the "interests of justice" under Article 53(1)(c),
this will tend to narrow through the elaboration of ex ante standards and/or
the consolidation of guiding jurisprudence.
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pursue a particular case will of course resonate beyond the
confines of the Court. As to its impact on the political arena, it
should be recognised that the fact that an issue has political
implications should not affect the legal quality of a determination
or cast doubt on the judicial process itself. As the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) recently observed, "that a question has
political aspects does not suffice to deprive it of its character as a
legal question," going on to recall "in determining the
jurisdictional issue of whether it is confronted with a legal
question, it is not concerned with the political nature of the
motives which may have inspired the request or the political
implications which its opinion might have."10 0 The ICJ has,
moreover, rejected suggestions that it should refuse to rule on a
legal issue on the grounds that its opinion might lead to adverse
political consequences.101 As the articles presented by Professors
Schabas and Lepard both discuss prosecutorial independence in
opposition to political manipulation, the final section below
considers the nature of the relationship between law and politics
within the ICC system.
III. LAW AND POLITICS

At the international level, the ordinary assumptions over the
enforcement of criminal law come up against several obvious
structural flaws. Whereas domestic courts enjoy the routine
expectations that orders for the search of premises, freezing of
assets, and warrants of arrest will be effected by law enforcement
agencies, no such automaticity adheres at the global level.
Instead, the execution of decisions issued by international courts is
entrusted to states, who serve as the proximate source of
compliance. 102 Philippe Kirsch, first President of the ICC,
described this relationship in terms of a two-pillar system: a
judicial pillar represented by the Court itself and an enforcement
pillar that relies on national authorities. 0 3 Within the judicial
pillar, the Court conducts its activities and the proceedings
according to the legal procedures set out in the Statute and Rules:
rights of the accused, due process, fair and impartial trials. Under

100. Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of

Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 141,
(July 22).

1 27

101. Id. 35.
102. Rod Rastan, The Responsibility to Enforce: connecting Justice with
Unity, in THE EMERGING PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT

167-69 (Carsten Stahn & Goran Sluiter eds., 2009).
103. Judge Phillipe Kirsch, President of the ICC, Address to the United
Nations General Assembly 4 (Nov. 1, 2007), available at http://www.icccpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/754F8043-22DB-4D78-9F8C-67EFBFC4736A/278573/PK
20071101 ENG.pdf.
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the enforcement pillar, in turn, states undertake to comply with
their legal obligations to cooperate with the Court-pursuant
either to Part 9 of the Statute or, in the case of a Security Council
referral, such duties as may be imposed on any UN Member State
pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN Charter.104 The
interoperability of law and politics within the ICC system
arguably revolves more around this interplay between judicial and
enforcement pillars, rather than the question of whether politics
infiltrates the legal process.
The challenge of a twin-pillar system is that while the Court
is independent of states and does not act on instructions from any
external source, states are also independent of the Court and
cannot be compelled by it. The task is therefore one of coordination
and the assumption of the legal obligations. Thus, a finding by the
Court of non-compliance by a state, for example, is to be referred
back to the Assembly of States Parties or the Security Council for
enforcement. 105 In practice, nonetheless, this also means that in
the absence of judicial powers to directly compel state co-operation
under threat of penalty, and without the availability of the
Security Council as a routine enforcement agent, compliance will
tend to fall back on the discrete decisions of individual states or
the Security Council to uphold the law. The effective operation of
the enforcement pillar, therefore, will depend on the degree to
which the collective community of states chooses to lend support to
the execution of judicial orders in order to promote compliance.106
Officials of all of the international courts and tribunals
routinely call on states or the Security Council to increase support
toward their institutions, to undertake arrest operations, and to
provide effective responses to non-co-operation. We may not expect
to see a domestic prosecutor or judge lobby the local police to
arrest a suspect, but an international court, as a consequence of
the twin pillar design, may often have to appeal to states to ensure
compliance. The question arises whether, bearing in mind the two
pillar system and the need for effective co-operation, an
104. See generally Rod Rastan, Testing Co-operation: The International
Criminal Court and NationalAuthorities, 21 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 431, 431-56
(2008).

105. Rome Statute, supra note 2, arts. 87(5), (7).
106. Such processes would seek to promote an enabling environment for the
Court by increasing the political effects of non-compliance and its impact on a
state's overall reputation in the international sphere. In this manner, the
adoption of issue-linkage strategies would seek to link a state's record of cooperation in one area (ICC co-operation) to its ability to participate in other
spheres of international activity (political, trade, development etc); Rastan,
supra note 102. On compliance theories, see generally George W. Downs &
Andrea W. Trento, Conceptual Issues Surrounding the Compliance Gap, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATION: CLOSING THE COMPLIANCE GAP 19
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international prosecutor should factor in the likely political
support for arrests and trials when deciding which situations and
cases to investigate. 07 While practice demonstrates that justice
has been most effective where there has been a confluence between
law and politics-between the demands of justice and the appetite
for its enforcement-should the law bend to politics, or is there
evidence that politics may also be shaped by law? Arguably, to
abandon the law to the political process, resulting in the
institution of criminal proceedings only where there is widespread
executive backing, would overlook the influence that the legal
process has been shown to exercise in shaping domestic
compliance. Debates over the wisdom and viability of indicting
Sudanese President Omar al Bashir, a sitting head of state, or
Joseph Kony, leader of the Lord's Resistance Army, viewed from
the perspective of peace and security, for example, echo in familiar
refrain the political disquiet that greeted the indictments by the
ICTY of the Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic in view of
negotiations leading up to Dayton, or the indictment of President
Slobodan Milosevic in the midst of the Kosovo conflict and ongoing
Rambouillet talks; or the unsealing of the SCSL indictment
against Charles Taylor, President of Liberia, as he arrived for
peace talks in Ghana.10 8 In each instance, the judicial process was
initially seen as a threat to efforts to end the bloodshed and, in the
case of Taylor, of triggering renewed violence. There was no
political consensus at the time for these cases to proceed: they
were driven forward not by political support, but by the assertion
of prosecutorial independence and the evidentiary trail.
Ultimately, the international community adjusted to the new legal
realities shaped by these tribunals: as these erstwhile leaders
became marginalised fugitives and their responsibility for the
instigation of violence became a matter of judicial record, they
increasingly came to be viewed as spoilers to the mediation process
and post-war recovery, not peacemakers.109 This created a
convergence between international peace and security and the
delivery of justice: resulting in issue-linkage strategies being
applied at the political level to secure compliance with court
orders. Although political support had to coalesce to secure the
timing of their eventual surrender, this relates to the operation of
the enforcement pillar, not the judicial pillar. Crucially, case
selection decisions were made by an independent prosecutor, not
107. See Schabas, supra note 53 and accompanying text.
108. Goldston, supra note 70, at 397-99; PRICILLA HAYNER, NEGOTIATING
PEACE IN LIBERIA: PRESERVING THE POSSIBILITY FOR JUSTICE (Henry Dunant

Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue Nov. 2007).
109. Hayner, supra note 108; Payam Akhavan, Are International Criminal
Tribunals a Disincentive to Peace?: Reconciling Judicial Romanticism with
PoliticalRealism, 31 HuM. RIGHTS Q. 624-54 (2009).
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by states.
Conversely, the failure of political actors to uphold the shared
community values will tend to weaken the pillars of justice. A
prevalence of disunity toward the judicial process will result in
irregularity, unpredictability, and the disordering of the overall
scheme, 110 increasing the prospect for perpetrators to avoid
apprehension and undermining efforts to end impunity. If
selection decisions are left to the mercy of politics, practice
suggests that, more often than not, realpolitik will pull in the
direction of non-engagement and non-confrontation; toward
balancing perceived evils against one another and by thus
negating the possibility for value judgments, removing the moral
imperative to act or intervene. As recurrent discussions within the
Security Council, General Assembly and Human Rights Council
suggest, the fluctuating assessments that inform national
interests at any given time means that states may not be able to
generate the desired consensus to act, or to maintain consensus
previously achieved.
It might be argued that limiting ICC activity to instances
where there is political sanction will result in the Court enjoying
better rates of compliance as a result of widespread support.
However, it also runs the risk of inviting passivity and inertia,
while providing no guarantee that any backing that is granted
would persist in the face of the alternating demands of the
political process. By reverse, attempting to subject politics to the
influence of an independent judicial actor might risk inadequate
support to the determent of successful enforcement.111 But practice
also demonstrates the capacity of the legal process to influence
state behaviour. The answer to the paradox thrown up by the twopillar system is not more politics, but more law.

110. Rastan, supra note 104 (citing Kiser Barnes, paper delivered at the
Conference on Law, De Poort, Neth., Dec. 14-17, 2006). See also BRIAN D.
LEPARD, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAw: A NEW THEORY WITH PRACTICAL
APPLICATIONS 81-82 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2010) (discussing the principle of
"unity in diversity").
111. See supra Part I.A. (outlining a similar range of views ventilated during
the negotiations of the Rome Statute).

